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EQUILIBRIUM  IN  A  MARKET  WITH 
SEQUENTIAL  BARGAINING 
BY  ARIEL  RUBINSTEIN  AND  ASHER  WOLINSKY 
This paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out 
a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and, upon meeting, initiate a 
bargaining process  over the  terms of  the transaction. The basic  bargaining problem  is 
treated with the strategic approach. 
The paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements; analyzes their dependence 
on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types; and discusses 
their relations with the competitive  equilibrium outcome  and other results in the search 
equilibrium literature. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
THIS PAPER CONSIDERS a market that operates in the following  way.  Pairs of 
agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together 
by a stochastic process. When two agents meet, they initiate a bargaining process 
over the terms of the transaction. If two agents reach an agreement a transaction 
takes place and they leave the market. Of course, the bargaining positions  and 
hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the 
conditions prevailing in the market. These will include the chances that each of 
the  negotiating  parties  have  of  meeting  other  partners in  the  event  that the 
agreement in the current negotiations is delayed; also the expected length of time 
required to  achieve  an  alternative transaction,  and  the  expected  behavior  of 
alternative partners. 
The study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, 
it captures some  realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets (e.g., 
asset markets such as housing and some labor markets). Secondly, it contributes 
to an understanding of the micro-mechanisms of price formation and their role 
in  shaping  market outcomes.  In  both  cases,  the  features  studied  are largely 
neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses. 
The related literature includes the articles by Diamond  [4, 5],  Diamond  and 
Maskin [6], Mortensen [8, 9], and Zusman and Bell [13]. These articles consider 
markets of  the  type  described  above,  in  which  transactions are concluded  at 
pairwise meetings of agents. The major difference between our work and these 
articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem. In the cited articles 
it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which 
divides  the  associated  surplus  in  an  arbitrary predetermined way  (when  the 
surplus is  assumed to  be  divided  equally, the  division  rule is,  in fact,  Nash's 
axiomatic bargaining solution).  In contrast, the present paper treats the basic 
bargaining problem  with  the  strategic approach  (see  Rubinstein  [19])  which 
constitutes  an  attempt to  look  into  the  bargaining black-box.  This  approach 
explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process, describes in-detail 
the bargaining procedure, and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in 
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the resulting game played between the bargaining parties. Thus, the present paper 
does not compete with the cited literature, but rather complements it by providing 
a micro-mechanism that seeks to capture, in a direct fashion, the manner in which 
market conditions  may influence negotiations and hence agreements with which 
these negotiations conclude  (see also Shaked and Sutton [11]). 
In Sections 2-4 we present the model, define the solution concept (the market 
equilibrium), and analyze it. There are two types of agents, and transactions are 
concluded  at pairwise meetings of agents of  opposite  types. We consider only 
stationary  equilibria  where  all  agents  of  a  particular type  employ  the  same 
semi-stationary strategy (a strategy that prescribes the same bargaining tactics 
against any potential opponent). A market equilibrium is a pair of such strategies 
which is protected from deviation of any agent using any strategy (not necessarily 
semi-stationary) after any possible history of the agent's market life (a perfectness 
type requirement). The main theorem (Section 4) claims existence and uniqueness 
of  the  market equilibrium and  characterizes it.  In  Section  5 we  examine  the 
equilibrium agreements. 
One  observation that is  worth mentioning  in the  introduction  concerns the 
relations between the equilibrium of the present model  and competitive equili- 
brium. Unsurprisingly, the equilibrium outcome  in this model is quite different 
from that which would be the competitive equilibrium if the trading mechanisms 
assumed here were replaced by the standard concept  of a competitive market. 
Perhaps of more interest is the observation that even as the costs associated with 
the  bargaining  and  matching  processes  are made  negligible,  the  equilibrium 
outcome  of  the present model  does  not approach the competitive  equilibrium 
outcome. This point is of interest since the competitive equilibrium concept does 
not specify a realistic micro-mechanism of the manner in which the competitive 
price  is  realized.  A  standard textbook  justification  for  its  use  is  that  under 
"competitive conditions," such as the insignificance of each individual agent and 
negligible transaction costs, it provides a good  approximation for the outcome 
that would be achieved with reasonable micro-mechanisms. But, with the quite 
natural micro-mechanism presented in this paper, the equilibrium outcomes do 
not converge to the competitive outcome as the frictions in the model are made 
indefinitely  small.  This  deviation  from the  competitive  equilibrium is  closely 
related to the familiar point made by Diamond [3] concerning the emergence of 
a monopoly-price  equilibrium in a market where the (numerous) sellers set the 
prices and the buyers' search is costly. Since in the present model the agents of 
both  types  are as likely  to  be  in  a position  to  "set prices" the  nature of  the 
deviation from the competitive equilibrium is different from that in Diamond's 
asymmetric model. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
The agents in the model  are of two different types denoted  by  1 and 2. All 
agents of a particular type are identical. When two agents of opposite types are 
matched, they bargain over the partition of  a unit surplus associated  with the SEQUENTIAL  BARGAINING  1135 
match. After two agents reach an agreement they leave the market. The model 
will focus  on steady state situations in which this flow of departure is matched 
by an equal arrival flow of new agents of both types. 
This framework can be interpreted in several ways. For example, the two types 
can be viewed  as sellers and buyers of a good.  Each seller has one unit for sale 
and each buyer is seeking to buy one unit. The surplus to be divided is then the 
difference between their respective reservation prices and an agreement amounts 
to the determination of  the price. Alternatively, one  may think of  a two-good 
exchange  economy.  A trader of type  1 has the initial endowment  (1, 0)  and a 
trader of type 2 has (0, 1). What has to be decided in a meeting is the point on 
the contract curve to be reached in the exchange. 
The market considered in the model operates over time. The time dimension 
is discrete. The time periods in the market life of an agent will be labelled with 
a nonnegative  integer  t where  t =0  is  the  time  period  at which  the  agent in 
question arrives in the market. No upper limit is placed on the value of t which 
corresponds to the assumption that, after arrival, he may remain indefinitely in 
the market. The two processes to be modelled which depend on time are matching 
and bargaining. 
The Matching Process 
At the beginning of each time period there is a matching stage in which each 
agent may meet at most  one  new partner (the term "new partner" refers to  a 
member of the opposite type with whom the agent did not bargain in the previous 
period). At each matching stage the probability for an agent of type 1 (2) to meet 
a new partner is a (,8), where 0 < a, 1,3  < 1. The parameters a  and 18  are assumed 
fixed over time. 
The last assumption has to do with our intention to focus  on a market at a 
steady state. We think of  a  and ,3 as functions of  N1 and N2 (Ni  is the size of 
the  population  of  type  i)  and the  meeting  technology  which  is  not  modeled 
explicitly.  At a steady state N1 and N2 are constant over time and therefore a 
and 18  are constant as well. 
REMARK:  To understand what we mean by a steady state, observe that given 
N1 and N2, a = a (N1, N2) and ,8 = ,3  (N1, N2) determine the rate at which matches 
are formed.  At  the  equilibrium  which  is  discussed  later,  a  and  18 will  also 
determine the rate at which agreements are reached and agents leave the markets. 
We assume that there is an exogenous  flow of agents into the market whereby 
in each period equal numbers of both types are added (if the added number were 
not equal, then one of the populations would be growing without a limit relative 
to the other). At a steady state N1 and N2 are such that the equilibrium flow of 
departures which is determined by a = a(N1,  N2) and 18  = p(N1,  N2) is exactly 
equal to  the  exogenous  flow of  arrivals. After we  present the  equilibrium the 
reader will  be  able to  verify that if  we  adopt,  for  example,  a linear meeting 
technology  whereby the number of matches in each period is k, N1 + k2N2, then 1136  A.  RUBINSTEIN  AND  A.  WOLINSKY 
for any exogenous  flow of arrivals and any initial difference d there exist N1 and 
N2 of steady state such that N2-  N1  d. 
The Bargaining Process 
At a given time period an agent can bargain with at most one  partner. The 
bargaining between two matched agents need not be concluded  in one period. 
In the wake of a matching stage, an agent can be in one of the following  three 
states: he has no partner; he has a new partner; he has a partner with whom he 
was already in the process of bargaining in the previous period. In either one of 
the latter two cases the parties proceed to the bargaining stage. 
The bargaining procedure is the same for all the time periods. Firstly, one of 
the parties is selected randomly, with probability 2 to propose a partition of the 
unit to  which  proposal  the  other party then  reacts with acceptance  (" Y")  or 
rejection ("N").  Acceptance of a proposal ends the bargaining and both parties 
leave the market. If a proposal is rejected, then the same bargaining procedure 
is repeated in the next time period unless the matching process assigns one or 
both of the parties a new bargaining partner for the next period. 
The bargaining procedure adopted here is a modified version of the alternating 
offers procedure  studied  by  Rubinstein [10]  and  Stahl [12]. This version was 
studied by Binmore [1] under the heading "random selection of proposers." 
The Order of Events 
As  is  evident  from  the  above  description,  the  processes  of  matching  and 
bargaining are interlaced. Let us present the exact connections between them by 
describing the order of events for a typical agent of type 1 at a certain time period 
(an analogous description will suit an agent of type 2). First, the matching stage 
takes place.  If the agent was not in the process  of bargaining in the previous 
period, then with probability a he meets a new partner with whom he proceeds 
to the bargaining stage, and with probability 1  -  a  he remains without a partner. 
If the agent was in the process of bargaining in the previous period and did not 
reach an agreement, then there are three possible  cases: with probability a  he 
meets a new partner and regardless of what happened  to his previous partner 
he  abandons  him  and  starts bargaining with  the  new  one;  with  probability 
(1 -  a)(1 -  ,8) neither the agent nor his previous partner meet new partners and 
they continue their bargaining in this period as well;  with probability (1 -  a),3 
the agent does not meet a new partner but his old partner does and so the agent 
remains without a partner until matched again at some future period. 
Notice  that  we  assume  that,  whenever  an  agent  meets  a  new  partner, he 
abandons  the  old  one.  It will  become  evident  that,  at the  equilibrium to  be 
discussed  later, this assumption is consistent  with rational behavior. What we 
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agent knows whether his old partner is still available and therefore the assumed 
choice  is natural.' The purpose of this assumption  is to  capture the idea that, 
when a bargaining process is dragged on, each party runs the risk of losing the 
deal and having to wait again for another opportunity. This risk creates a pressure 
on the bargaining parties to  reach an agreement. Of course, this point  can be 
captured by somewhat  different assumptions  as well  (say, probabilistic  choice 
between an old and a new partner). But the reader can verify that such modifica- 
tions will not alter the qualitative nature of the equilibrium results. 
Preferences 
An agent may leave the market t periods after entering it with a fraction z of 
the unit surplus (O  -  z -  1, t  - 0), or else he may continue meeting and bargaining 
without ever reaching an agreement. All agents are assumed to be maximizers of 
expected utility. The utility of getting a fraction z at time t is the same for both 
types of agents and is given by 8'z, where 8 < 1 is a discount factor. A utility of 
O  is assigned to an agent who never leaves the market. 
We chose  the form  8'z mainly for the sake of simplicity. It seems, however, 
2 
that the discussion can be extended to a much wider family of time preferences. 
Histories 
It is assumed that the agents have perfect recall. A possible history of an agent 
at a certain stage of his market life is a sequence  of all the observations made 
by him up to that stage. During any period,  T, the agent receives the relevant 
information sequentially. That is, he gets one by one the answers to the following 
questions in the following  order: (I) Does  he have a partner at period  T? If so, 
did he have this same partner at period  T -  1? (II)  Who was selected to make 
an offer at T? (III) What was the offer at period  T? (IV) What was the response 
to that offer? This information is added to the information accumulated until the 
end of period  T -  1. Thus, a possible history at a certain stage in period  T is a 
sequence of answers to the above questions in all the previous periods and up 
to that stage at period  T. 
We shall be particularly interested in the histories after which the agents have 
to make decisions.  Let H  T  be the set of all possible histories which end with the 
information that, at period  T, the agent has a partner and that the bargainer of 
1 We have a continuous time version of this model in which a new partner can arrive at any point 
in the interval of time elapsed between consecutive stages in an ongoing bargaining process. In that 
version,  the  assumed  choice  is  obvious  since  the  arrival of  a  new  partner strictly precedes  the 
resumption of the bargaining. We chose not to present that version since it yields the same results 
while it is more complicated. 
2 We think that the discussion  can be extended to the family of time preferences over the pairs 
(x, t)  representable by  8tu(x).  As shown by Fishbum  and Rubinstein [7] this is the family of  all 
monotonic,  continuous,  and stationary time preferences. 1138  A.  RUBINSTEIN  AND  A.  WOLINSKY 
type i (i = 1, 2) was selected to make an offer.3 Let HRTi be the set of all possible 
histories which  end at period  T with the information about the offer to which 
the bargainer of type i (i = 1, 2) has to respond. 
Finally, notice that an agent remembers the identity of his partner only as long 
as they  are in the process  of  bargaining (see  question  I above).  He  does  not 
remember, however, the identities of those with whom he had bargained in the 
past (and broken off). That is, if he happens to meet again an agent with whom 
he had already bargained and broken off, he treats him as a new partner. 
Strategies 
In what follows a partition of the unit surplus, (x, 1 -  x), will be identified with 
the fraction, x, received by the agent of type  1. That is, saying that parties to a 
bargaining process agree on the partition x amounts to saying that the agent of 
type  1 receives x and his partner receives 1 -  x. 
A  strategy for  an  agent  of  type  1, fe  SI,  is  a  sequence  of  decision  rules, 
f = (ft)t=.  The tth decision  rule, f',  describes the agent's behavior conditional 
on  the  information  he  will  have gathered until  he  has to  make a decision  at 
period  t. That is, ft  is a function defined over all the histories in Ht,  and HRI- 
If ht  c'  Hol, then the agent (who is of type 1) has to make an offer andft (ht)  E [0, 1]. 
If hte-HR,  then the agent has to respond to an offer and ft(ht)  c {" Y", "N"}. 
Finally, a strategy for an agent of type 2 can be analogously  defined, and will 
be denoted by g c S2. 
In the sequel we shall sometimes refer to a special type of strategy. A semi- 
stationary strategy prescribes the same bargaining tactics against all the partners 
that the agent might meet. That is, the length  of the waiting periods,  and the 
nature and number of the unsuccessful bargaining processes that the agent has 
gone through do not affect his bargaining strategy against a new partner. More 
formally, let ht and ht' be two histories such that the last piece  of information 
in each is that the agent has just met a new partner. A semi-stationary strategy, 
f, is such that, for any two histories h  T and h  T' ( T -  t = T'-  t'),  which coincide 
with  ht  and  ht' in  their  earlier parts  and  are  identical  thereafter,  we  have 
fT(h  T)  =fT'  (hT).  Let Si denote  the set of  all semi-stationary strategies for an 
agent of type  i. 
The Equilibrium 
Given the strategy fc  SI and semi-stationary strategy g c S2,  let  U(fg,  g)(hT) 
be the value  at time  T of  the expected  utility to  an agent of  type  1 who  has 
Notice  that the set Hoi includes  personal histories of both type  i and type j $  i agents. Thus, 
when a personal history of a type 1 agent belongs to HoJ, it ends with the information that, at period 
T, this agent himself was selected to make an offer; when a personal history of a type 2 agent belongs 
to  Ho,  it ends with the information that, at period  T, this agent's opponent  was selected to make 
an offer and hence the agent himself has no decision  to make at this point. An analogous  remark 
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experienced  the  history  hT, and who  employs  the  strategy f E S1 while  all his 
potential partners employ the semi-stationary strategy g E S2 (the possibility that 
the agent reaches an agreement x  at time  t  - T appears in  U (f, g)(h T)  as the 
term $ -Tx  weighted by the appropriate probability).  Notice  that  U1(f, g)(h T) 
depends  on  two  sequences  of  independent  random  variables.  One  sequence 
determines the rate at which new matches are formed and old matches break up 
(given the parameters a,  ,3), while the other sequence determines the proposer 
at each bargaining stage. Notice  further that for  Ul(f,  g)(hT)  to be meaningful 
it is essential that g be semi-stationary. If g were not semi-stationary, the histories 
of the agent's partners could be important as well, but since they are not known 
to the agent,  U,(f,  g)(hT)  would have little meaning. Similarly, given g E S2 and 
fE  Si one can define  U2(f, g)(hT). 
We are now ready to define the market equilibrium. 
DEFINITION:  A  market equilibrium  is  a  pair  of  semi-stationary  strategies 
(f*, g*)  such that all agents of type  1 employ  strategy f*, all agents of type 2 
employ strategy g*, and for all possible histories hT, 
U,(f*,  g*)(h  T)  U(f,  g*)(h  T)  for all  f E S1, 
U2(f*, g*)(hT) 
T 
U2(f*, g)(h  T)  for all  g c S2. 
Thus, in looking for a market solution we restrict our attention to configurations 
where all  agents  employ  semi-stationary strategies and where  all  agents of  a 
certain type use the same strategy. Without this restriction we cannot analyze the 
bargaining process as bargaining with complete information and will face instead 
the much more complicated problem of bargaining with incomplete information 
and probably with ignorance. Notice, however, that the equilibrium is protected 
against any possible  deviation fE  SI (not  necessarily semi-stationary). Finally, 
observe that the equilibrium has the flavor of Selten's subgame perfectness. Given 
any history  h  T  including  histories which  are not consistent  with f*,  an agent 
cannot improve his expected payoff by deviating from his equilibrium strategy. 
3.  A  BARGAINING  GAME  WITH  RANDOM  SELECTION  OF  PROPOSERS 
The bargaining between two matched agents is an important component of the 
model. In order to analyze it we present in this section a sequential bargaining 
game and derive its perfect equilibrium. In a later section we shall incorporate 
this game into the model and make the necessary adjustments to identify it with 
the bargaining that goes on in the considered market. 
The game is played by two players, 1 and 2, who bargain over the partition of 
a unit. The bargaining process takes place over time, and the discrete time periods 
will be denoted by t, t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ....  In each period one of the players is selected 
randomly (with probability I and independently of previous selections) to propose 
a partition of  the unit. The other player has to  react to the offer in the same 
period by accepting it-"  Y"-or  rejecting it-"N".  If a partition x  is agreed 1140  A.  RUBINSTEIN  AND  A.  WOLINSKY 
upon at time  t, then the game ends and the outcome is described as (x, t)  (recall 
that partition x means that player 1 receives the fraction x and player 2 receives 
the fraction 1-x). 
Let ui(z, t)  denote the utility to player i from getting the fraction z at time  t. 
Thus, according to  our notational  convention  the utilities  associated  with the 
outcome (x, t)  are ul(x, t)  and u2(1  -x,  t).  It is assumed that, for all z, ui(z, 0) =  z 
and ui(z, t) c [0, 1]. It is further assumed that ui(z, t)  and z -  ui(z, t)  are strictly 
increasing in  z, that the utility of  perpetual nonagreement is  ui(O,  xo) 0= , and 
that  ui(z, t)  is  stationary over time.4 The  stationarity assumption  means  that 
ui(z, 0)  - ui(z', 1) if and only if ui(z, t)  ,  ui(z',  t+  1) for all t. Finally, it is assumed 
that the players are expected utility maximizers. 
A strategy in this game, f=  (ft)t=o,  has the same structure as the strategies 
defined in Section 2. The definition of a history, ht, is slightly different here. In 
this game there are only three pieces of information collected each period. These 
are the answers to questions II, III, IV in the definition of a history in Section 2. 
The following  proposition  deals with existence, uniqueness,  and characteriz- 
ation of the perfect equilibrium of the considered bargaining game. This proposi- 
tion is analogous to the main theorem in Rubinstein [10] and is similar to a result 
in Binmore [1]. For the sake of brevity we omit the proof.5 
PROPOSITION  1:  The system 
1=uJ(X, 
1) +  ul(y  1, 
1  -X  U20(-  Y,  1)  +2U20  -  X,  1), 
has a unique solution (x*, y*) such that y* -  x*, and the unique  perfect equilibrium 
(P.E.) of the game, (f*, g*),  is 
x*,  ht  eHti 
f(ht)=  "6Y",  ht E HtI  and the last proposal was y By*, 
6"N",  ht c Ht1  and the last proposal was y < y*; 
ry*9  0'H  2, 
g't(ht)=  "6Y",  ht E HR2  and the last proposal was x - x*, 
6"N",  ht  c'  HR2 and the last proposal was x > x*. 
REMARK:  Notice  that the meaning of  system (1) is that x* and y*  are such 
that player  1 is just indifferent between  accepting  y*  or rejecting it and then 
getting with equal probabilities x* and y* in the next period. Similarly, player 2 
4 For the purposes of this paper we need only consider functions u,  (z, t) such that ui  (z, 1) = a, + biz, 
where 0  bi < 1. We treat here the more general case not only because it is more general but also 
because in doing so we simplify the required notation. 
S The proof appears in an earlier version of this paper; see D.P. 83/63,  ICERD,  London School 
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is just indifferent between getting 1  -  x* this period, or, rejecting it and getting 
1  x*  or 1 - y*  in the next period. 
4.  MARKET  EQUILIBRIUM 
This section contains the main theorem that deals with existence, uniqueness, 
and characterization of the market equilibrium. 
THEOREM:  There  exists a unique  market  equilibrium  (M.E.), (f*, g*). The  equili- 
brium strategies are 
[x*,  h(eHO I 
f* (h t) =  Y"  ,  h t e HR  and the last offer was y :  y*, 
"N"  otherwise; 
Y*,  hteH02, 
g*(h  t)  =  "  Y  Y",  ht  E HRt2 and the last  proposal  was x  x*, 
"N",  otherwise; 
where 
2(1-8)+  Sa -8(1-8)(1-a)(1-83) 
=*  2(1-8)+8a+8/3 
Sa + (1 - 8)8(1  - a)(1  -/) 
=  2(1 -8)+8a+8f3 
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the theorem (the nature of 
the equilibrium and the meaning of x* and y* will be discussed in the following 
section). 
Recall that the  equilibrium strategies are constrained to be  semi-stationary. 
Since a semi-stationary strategy is such that the same bargaining strategy is used 
against every partner, it is characterized by a bargaining strategy in the bargaining 
game described in Section 3. That is, there is one-to-one correspondence between 
the set of  semi-stationary strategies and the set of  strategies in the bargaining 
game of Section 3. Let f,  g  denote the strategies in the bargaining game which 
correspond to the semi-stationary strategies f E S1, g c S2. 
The proof  consists  of  three claims.  Claim  1 shows  that every M.E.,  (f, g), 
induces a P.E., (f, g),  in the bargaining game of Section 3 with properly chosen 
utility functions. Claim 2 uses Proposition I to show that the P.E. of the bargaining 
game is  (f*,  g*),  where f*  and g*  are the strategies described in the Theorem. 
Thus, Claims 1 and 2 prove uniqueness and characterize the M.E. Claim 3 shows 
that (f*,  g*)  is indeed M.E. Thus, Claim 3 proves existence and Claims 1, 2 prove 
uniqueness and characterize the M.E. 
Before we turn to the claims we need the following  preparations. First, given 
f  E SI and  g  E S2,  we introduce special notation  for the expected  utility in two A.  RUBINSTEIN  AND  A.  WOLINSKY 
special cases. Let 
Vl(f, g) = U  g)(h°),  I(f, g=  U,  W(f,  g)(h  ), 
where h° includes only the information that, at period 0, the agent does not have 
a partner, and h° includes only the information that, at period 0, he has a partner. 
Similarly, given g E S2 and fe  S1, one can define  V2(f, g)  and  W2(f, g). 
Next, consider an agent of type 1 and let hT be a history which ends with the 
information that the agent has a partner at period  T. Given f  S1, g E S2, the 
value of  Ul(f,  g)(h T) can be calculated as follows. First consider the correspond- 
ing strategies f, g in the bargaining game. There exists a distribution of outcomes, 
(x, t),  in  the  bargaining game  when  it  is  played  with f,  g  after the  relevant 
bargaining history which is implied by hT. Second,  let r be a random variable 
which represents the length of time until the breakdown of the current bargaining 
process. That is, r will assume the value to with the conditional probability that, 
if  no  agreement is reached in the next  to periods,  the  current bargaining will 
break down  at  T+  to. Therefore, conditional  on the fact that no  agreement is 
reached,  Prob (r>  to) = y'o  where  y = (  -  a)(1  -,).  The  distributions  of  (x,  t) 
and r determine  UI(f, g)(h T) as follows: 
(2)  U1(f  g)(hT)=  E  Prob[(x,  t)=(xo,  to)]{6'ox  Prob (r>  to) 
(xo, to) 
to 
+  E  An  Prob (r>  n-1)[aWl(f,  g)+/3(1-a)VI(f,  g)]} 
n=l 
E  (yt'tx)±+  E  E  yfn-l1n[a  Wl(f,  g) 
(x,t)  (x,t)  n=1 
+  3(1 -  a) Vl(f, g)]. 
The  expectation  operator  in  the  last  line  is,  of  course,  with  respect  to  the 
distribution of outcomes in the bargaining game played with f, g after the relevant 
bargaining history of the current partners. Notice that the first term on the r.h.s. 
accounts for the possibility that the current bargaining process will be concluded 
successfully, while the second term accounts for the possibility that it will break 
down. In the latter event the expected utility at the point of the breakdown is 
either W1 or V1. 
The formula (2) was derived from semi-stationary strategies, but can be exten- 
ded. To see this, let fc  S1, g E S2, and hT be as before and let f' E S  be a strategy 
which might differ from f  only after histories which are continuations of hT and 
include the information that the partner is still the same one this agent of type 
1 had at period T. That is, f'  might differ from f  only for the duration of a single 
bargaining  process.  Now,  formula  (2)  is  valid  for  U(f',  g)(hT).  Here  the 
expectation operator is with respect to the distribution of outcomes (x, t) in the 
bargaining game played  with the bargaining strategy prescribed by f'  for the 
current bargaining process and with g. The argument of  V1(f, g) and  W1(f, g) is 
still f, since f'  differs from f  only during the current bargaining process. Finally, 
the analogous formula can be derived for  U2(f, g)(hT). 
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CLAIM  1:  If (f, g)  is a M.E., then (f,  -) is a P.E. of the bargaining game of 
Section 3 with utility functions 
U1(Z,  t) =  yt6 tz+  E  yn1,86[aWI+f(I  -ca)VI], 
n=I 
ti= 
U2(Z, t) = yt,6  tz +  E  yn-16n[/3W2+a(1  -P3)V2], 
n=1 
where Vi= Vi(f,g),  Wi= Wi(fg),  and y=(l-a)(l-,/3). 
PROOF:  First notice that ul and u2  satisfy the conditions of Section 3. Assume 
that (f, g)  is not a P.E. in the bargaining game. Then there exists a history hT  in 
the bargaining game such that one of the players, say player 1, has a profitable 
deviation fo. That is, 
(3  )  U, ( fo, g )(h  )>U,  f,  )(h)- 
Define  a market strategy, f e  S1, as  follows:  when the agent bargains with his 
first partner he  follows  fo;  with  any  other partner he  follows  the  bargaining 
strategy f  Let hT  be the market history of a type 1 agent who, at his first period, 
met a partner and has since then bargained with him according to the history h  T. 
From (2) and the choice  of ul(z, t) we have 
(4)  U, (f  g) (hT)  E  u  I(z, t)-=Ul, (  ) (hT) 
(z,t) 
where the  last equality follows  from the definition of  UL and the expectation 
operator is with respect to the distribution of  outcomes  in the game with f  g- 
after hT. From the choice  of f',  (3) and (4) it follows that 
Ul(f,  g)(hT)  =  U1(f0,  g)(hf)>  Uh(f,  g)(hT) 
=  U1(f,  g)(hT) 
in contradiction to the assumption that (f  g)  is a M.E.  Q.E.D. 
CLAIM  2:  If there exists a M.E., it is unique and is given by the pair (ft,  g*) 
described in the Theorem. 
PROOF:  Let (f  g) be a M.E. By Claim 1 the pair (f, g) is a P.E. of the bargaining 
game with the utility functions  ul and u2 described there. By Proposition  1, we 
have that this P.E. must be the one described there. That is, the P.E. strategies f 
and g- are characterized by numbers x and y which satisfy the equations 
y=2u(x,  1) +  1(y,  1)+=[27(x  + 1y)  +  -aWV  +  3(-a)  VI], 
1x  =  2U20-  Y,  1)  +21U20-  X,  1) 
=  iy8 t(I1 -  X +  I -  Y) +  5[l3  W2 +  at (1 -  18) V21. A.  RUBINSTEIN  AND  A.  WOLINSKY 
With these strategies we have that Wi  = Wi(f; g)  are given by 
W1 =  x +  y, 
W2 =  (1-x)+  2(i1-y). 
Further, from the definition of  Vi  = Vi(f, g)  we have 
V1 =  8[(1-a)V1+  a W], 
V2  =  [(1-p)  V2  +  W2]. 
Thus, there are six equations with six variables (x, y, V1, V2, W1, W2) and it is a 
matter of routine calculations to show that x  and y  are equal to the values x* 
and y* given in the Theorem. Therefore, if (f  g) is a M.E., it must coincide with 
(f*, g*) of the Theorem.  Q.E.D. 
It remains to show that there exists a M.E. 
CLAIM 3:  The pair (f,,  g*) described in the Theorem is a M.E. 
PROOF: Consider an agent of type 1. First we show that, when all type 2 agents 
employ strategy g*, this agent faces a Markov decision problem. Then we use a 
known  result to  derive the  optimal  policy  for  this  Markov decision  process. 
Finally,  the  optimality  of f*  will  follow  from identifying  it with  the  derived 
optimal policy. 
The problem of a type 1 agent is equivalent to the following  Markov decision 
problem. The state space is {el, e2, e3, e4} where: el denotes that the agent does 
not have a partner; e2 means the agent has a partner and he has to make an 
offer; e3 represents that the agent has a partner and the partner has offered y,; 
e4 means  agreement was  reached  (an  absorbing  state).  The  set  of  actions  is 
A = {stop, continue}, where the action stop means to reach an agreement (i.e., 
accept y,  or offer x*). At each time period t this Markov decision process is at 
state et E {el, e2, e3, e4} and the agent takes an action  at e A. The process starts 
at  initial  state  elc  {el, e2,  e3}  and  proceeds  according  to  the  transition  prob- 
abilities,  Prob (et+l  = e3a'  = stop)  =  1,  and  Prob (et+l  = eile  = ej,  a = continue) 
which are given by the matrix 
el  e2  e3  e4 
e,-  1-a  a  1  0-  e~  1 -a  \a  ~a  0 
e2  (1-a)P  0(l-(  -a)0)  (l1-(1  -a)f  )  0 
e3  (l-a)  ½(1-(1 
-  a)fi)  ½  (1  - 
(1-  a))  0 
e4  -  0  0  0  1_ 
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The periodic payoff is 
x*,  e  =  el,  a  = stop, 
Oc(et, a')=  y*  e'=  e2,  a'=  stop, 
0,  otherwise. 
The objective is to find a policy  D,  D(e°,...,  e', t)=  a', that, given the initial 
state e°, maximizes  P(D,  e°) = E[,0=o  8't(e',  a')]. 
It  is  well  known  that  for  such  a  Markov decision  problem  there  exists  a 
stationary optimal policy  (see Derman [2]). Here there is only a limited number 
of stationary policies  and all of the form: stop whenever e' belongs to a certain 
subset of  {el, e2, e3}. A routine computation will reveal that the following  two 
stationary policies  are optimal:  D* =stop  whenever e'  {e2, e3},  and D'=  stop 
only  when  e  = e2.  The  values  are  0(D*,el)=1a(x,+y*)/[l-(1  -a)c], 
P(D*,  e2) =  x,,  and  P(D*,  e3) = y,. 
Now, notice that any strategy  f E S  implies a policy D and that for any history 
hT  ending at one  of the states  el,  e2,  e3,  U1(f,  g*)(hT)=  P(D,  e°=  ei).  Notice 
further that the optimal policy  D*  is precisely the behavior prescribed by the 
strategy  f,.  Therefore, after the history h' E HoI and h' E HR1 where the last offer 
was y*, the strategy f*  is optimal. Finally, given  h' e Ht1  where the last offer 
was y $ y,,  the agent has to compare y to 
(1-a)38P0(D*,  el)+(1l-(1-  a)3)8)5[(D*,  e2)+  ((D*,  e3)]. 
On substituting the values of  P(D*,  ei) we get that the above expression is equal 
to y,.  Therefore, it is optimal to reject y < y  and accept y > y,,  which is what 
the strategy f,  suggests.  Q.E.D. 
5.  AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SOLUTION 
The main theorem established that the equilibrium agreement is such that type 
1 agents get 
2(1-  5) + 5a  -  8(1 -  )(1  -  a)(1  -3) 
(5)  x2(1  )+a  or 
8a +(1-  8)8(1-  a)(1 -f) 
Y*=  2(1-  )+  a+  8/ 
of the unit depending on the random selection of the proposer at each particular 
match. The equilibrium involves an absence of impasse: one partner makes an 
offer x,  or y,  which the other immediately accepts. Obviously, x*>  y,  which 
reflects the bargaining advantage of being the first to propose. However, as we 
shall see shortly, the difference between x* and y,  is negligible when the degree 
of impatience or the length of the period between bargaining sessions  is small. 
The value for a type  1 agent of participating in the market is 
(6)  V1  =  1  -  x  2(1 -  a)+  +  I -5+  5a  2  \2  *+22  =2(l-5)+5a+5S8 
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Similarly, for a type 2 agent it is 
581  11  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ 
12  8  -8  - x*) + 2 ( 1-Y*))  2(81  -  ,)  +  ,3  +  ,8 
In what follows we examine how the equilibrium values of x* and  Vi depend 
on  the  parameters of  the  model.  Recall  that what  drives the  agents to  settle 
immediately rather than drag on with the negotiations are the facts that time is 
valued and that disagreement in bargaining involves  a loss  of time. There is a 
direct loss of time due to the period lost between consecutive bargaining sessions 
and an indirect loss of time due to the possibility  of losing a partner and then 
having to wait for another opportunity. The equilibrium agreement depends on 
the relative importance of these two elements. They are captured in the model 
by the parameters 6, a, and 13  which are exogenous  throughout. 
The Role of 8 
When the  degree of  impatience is small  (8  is close  to  1), then the  decisive 
forces are the respective market opportunities as represented by a  and 13,  and 
the unit is divided approximately according to the relative sizes of a  and 13.  To 
see this observe that 
(7)  lim'x  = lim y  = lim V1  = 
If, however, the degree of impatience is large (8  is near 0), then the direct loss 
associated with one period's delay overshadows other considerations. In such a 
case the parties have approximately the same power and what determines each 
particular agreement is the random selection of the proposer. To see this observe 
that 
(8)  lim x*  =  1,  lim y* = 0,  lim  V1  = 0. 
The Length of a Bargaining Period 
The equilibrium agreement also depends  on the significance of a bargaining 
period for the parties. To capture this point explicitly,  let A denote the length 
of one period and let  a(A)  = aA,  3(A) ==,3A, and  (A) = e-rA, where a  and 13 
are the arrival rates of new partners for the different types, and r is the subjective 
rate of time preference. On substituting a(A),  18(A), and 8(A)  into (5) and (6), 
one  gets the equilibrium values as functions  of  :A.  Since in many settings it is 
reasonable to assume that the length of one bargaining period is "small", let us 
consider the limiting equilibrium values as A -- 0. Using l'Ho'pital's  rule we obtain 
r+a  a 
(9)  lim x  ) z=  limy  2r+a+(x  A=lim  V  2(,+)=  A o-~  *  -  A-o  *  2r +ax+  ,13  '  -o  2r + a + ,13 SEQUENTIAL  BARGAINING  1147 
Thus, when the period between consecutive  stages of the bargaining process is 
"short", the unit is divided approximately in the ratio (r + a): (r+ /3). 
The Agreement as a Function of N1 and N2 
Recall that the parameters a and /3 are viewed as functions of N1 and N2 (the 
respective population sizes of type 1 and 2). The exact functional forms depend, 
of  course,  on  the  matching  (or  search)  technology  which  was  not  modeled 
explicitly. Assume that this technology is such that the per-period overall rate of 
meetings,  M, is fixed,6 and that all agents of  a particular type are as likely to 
take part in one  of the period's meetings. Thus, a (A) = (M/  N1)A and  8 (,)  = 
(M/N2)A.  On substituting these into (7) and (9) we get 
(10)  lim X*=limy~  (MN1N  ( 10  lim 8xe  = IamlY  (MI NI) + (MI N2)  N, + N2' 
r + (M/  N1) 
( 
l'O  x*  = 
A-*O  2r + (M/  N1) + (M/  N2) 
(rN1N2/M)+  N2 
(2rN,  N2/M)  +  N1 +  N2' 
The relative sizes of N1 and N2 affect the equilibrium agreement in the expected 
direction: the greater is N2 relative to N1, the larger will be the equilibrium share 
of  agents of  type  1. That is, members of the short side of the market have an 
advantage, but their advantage does not enable them to appropriate all the surplus. 
The Relations with Competitive  Equilibrium 
The last observations suggest that the solution described above is very different 
from the competitive equilibrium outcome, despite the fact that the market under 
consideration has many of the basic properties which are thought to characterize 
a competitive  environment. To  clarify this  statement consider  the example  in 
which type  1 agents are sellers and type 2 agents are buyers of  an indivisible 
good.  Each seller has one unit for sale and his reservation value is zero. Each 
buyer seeks to buy one unit and his reservation value is one. Let us maintain the 
steady state assumption that there are always Ni agents of type i. The competitive 
equilibrium is a price that equates demand to supply. If in the example considered 
here N2>  N1, then the competitive equilibrium price is  1 and the sellers (type 
1) appropriate all the surplus. This result stands in sharp contrast to the equili- 
brium outcome in our model as captured by (10) and (11). 
6 There are several ways to relate M  to N1 and N2. One example is the linar search technology 
M = k1  N, + k2N2, where ki is interpreted as the search intensity of type i agents and hence  kiNi is 
interpreted as the total number of meetings initiated by type  i agents. Using such a representation 
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It seems that this contrast points out a certain difficulty in the meaning of the 
concept of  competitive equilibrium. To see this recall that the missing element 
from the description of  a competitive market is the specification of the micro- 
mechanism which leads to the formation of prices. A standard textbook justifica- 
tion for the competitive equilibrium concept is that, under "competitive condi- 
tions" such as smallness of the agents and negligible transaction costs, reasonable 
mechanisms  of  price  formation  will  lead  approximately  to  the  competitive 
equilibrium  price.  The  model  of  this  paper  specifies  a  reasonable  mechan- 
ism of price formation in the context of a market whose basic characteristics are 
very similar to those of a competitive market. The seeming difference is that, in 
the present model, the interaction among traders may involve time costs (in the 
event that an agreement is not reached immediately). However, it seems that any 
reasonable mechanism of price formation must involve some type of costs and 
the idea behind the concept of competitive equilibrium is that it approximately 
describes the outcome when such costs are made negligible. Yet, even in the limit 
of the present model, as the time costs are made negligible (i.e., 8 -> 1 or A -> 0), 
the equilibrium result as given by (10) or (I 1) is quite different from the competi- 
tive equilibrium outcome described above. 
The significant deviation from the competitive  equilibrium (even  when  A is 
negligibly small) is closely  related to the familiar point made by Diamond  [3]. 
Diamond  considers  a market where the sellers  set the prices, and each buyer 
knows the price distribution but can find out about a particular seller's price only 
by incurring a positive search cost k. The result is that, regardless of how small 
is  k  (provided  that  k>  0)  and despite the  presence  of  many sellers, the  only 
perfect equilibrium price is the monopoly price. The intuitive argument follows 
from the observation that whenever the lowest price is lower than the monopoly 
price, the seller who charges this price can profit from slightly raising it (the price 
raise will not drive away any customers if it is small relative to  k).  Obviously, 
the result is due to the existence of buyers' search costs and due to the fact that 
sellers can commit themselves to prices while buyers cannot (if only buyers can 
commit themselves to prices and if the sellers incur the cost k, then the equilibrium 
price is the monopsony  price). 
The  deviation  from  the  competitive  equilibrium  in  the  present  model  is 
explained by the same elements which appear in a somewhat more complicated 
combination.  Here  both  buyers  and  sellers  can  be  in  a  position  to  commit 
themselves  to  a price but only for the duration of  one  period,  and both sides 
incur costs of delay (search) which in this case are determined endogeneously. 
A similar argument to the one presented by Diamond shows that in any meeting 
the party who makes the offer (commits itself for one period) is able to appropriate 
the other party's cost of  delay. But, in contrast to  Diamond's  model, this does 
not make the prices crawl to the monopoly (or monopsony)  price, since because 
of the symmetric role of the parties, a party can reject an offer knowing that it 
has a chance to become a proposer in the next meeting. The balance is struck at 
the pair x*,  y* which has the property that each proposer takes full advantage 
of  its rival's cost  of  delay. As in Diamond's  model  here too  the extent of the SEQUENTIAL  BARGAINING  1149 
deviation from the competitive equilibrium does not depend on the absolute size 
of the costs  of  delay  (the length of the period)  but rather on the existence  of 
such positive costs. In fact, the average equilibrium agreement, 2(x* + y*), depends 
on the relative sizes  of  the parties' costs  of  delay,  while the  absolute  sizes  of 
these costs affect only the advantage, x* -  y*, of being the proposer. 
The Relations with the Diamond-Mortensen Approach 
Finally, let us point out the relations between the equilibrium agreement in 
the present model  and the equilibrium agreement of the type discussed  in the 
above cited works of Diamond and Mortensen. In their models when two agents 
meet they agree immediately on an equal division of the difference between the 
unit and the sum of their reservation values. That is, they adopt Nash's bargaining 
solution.  Let (x, 1  -xi)  denote the equilibrium partition obtained in the present 
model when  our strategic approach is replaced by Nash's bargaining solution, 
and  let  Vi, i=  1, 2,  denote  the  agents' reservation values  in this  case.  At this 
equilibrium 
- 1=  -  8V2  -86V2 
1-i=8V2+l  a'82 
V1  = ax  +(1  -a)8VI, 
V2  -1 (1  -  )+(1  - p)8V2. 
By solving this system we get the equilibrium agreement 
1-8  + 8a 
2(1 -8)+8a+8I38 
Comparing x  with the  equilibrium agreements of  our model,  x*  and y*,  we 
discover that 
x =  (x*+ y*),  laim  x = limx*,  lim5x = lim x*. 
Thus, at the limits (as  8 --  1 or A -- 0), the axiomatic bargaining approach and 
the strategic approach result in the same equilibrium agreements. When the time 
value of one bargaining period has some significance, the equilibrium agreements 
differ, x* > x >  y*, but the values attached to participation in the market are still 
the  same,  Vi =  Vi. 
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